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Sometimes, It’s a Child and a Choice:  
Toward an Embodied Abortion Praxis1
JEANNIE LUDLOW
Feminist analyses of recent abortion politics in the United States note 
that the “abortion debate” has settled into a system of dichotomies, such 
as the dichotomy between women’s autonomy on the abortion rights side 
and the value of unborn life on the anti-abortion side. This article posits 
that these dichotomizations contribute to the erosion of women’s access 
and rights to abortion through loss of credibility for abortion rights dis-
course and loss of access to abortion praxis that can handle more complex 
situations. Maintenance of the dichotomies requires denial or erasure 
of more complicated situations, like late-second-trimester abortion and 
situations in which women grieve their aborted fetuses. Drawing on her 
experiences working in an abortion clinic, the author argues that a more 
complete consideration of these more complex abortion experiences could 
interrupt the erosion of our reproductive rights.
Keywords: abortion rights / Partial Birth Abortion Ban / fetus / late-term 
abortion / abortion praxis / United States
It was my first D&X (dilation and extraction) procedure. I had been work-
ing as a patient advocate at an abortion clinic for about three weeks; the 
patient was about 22 weeks LMP—that is, it had been about 22 weeks 
since the first day of her last menstrual period, the point from which 
doctors measure gestation, for purposes of consistency. The abortion was 
elective. There was no fetal anomaly, no threat being posed to the woman 
by her pregnancy. She simply could not afford to have a baby, and it took 
her several months to save up the money for her abortion. According to 
the Allan Guttmacher Institute, this woman is typical of second trimes-
ter abortion patients. The top four reasons women cite for having abor-
tions after 16 weeks LMP are (in order): lack of knowledge that they are 
pregnant; difficulty in making arrangements for the procedure (including 
finances, transportation, and childcare); fear of telling their parents or part-
ners about the pregnancy or abortion; and need for more time to come to 
a decision about the pregnancy. Almost half of women having second tri-
mester abortions cite financial or logistical reasons for waiting until after 
sixteen weeks of pregnancy to abort (Allan Guttmacher Institute 2005). Of 
course, as historian Rickie Solinger demonstrates in Beggars and Choos-
ers, “choice” is complicated by these difficulties. Solinger explains how 
in the United States, “choice” to abort is always already circumscribed 
by race, class, access, and resources (2001, 6–7). In addition, Dorothy 
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Roberts’ Killing the Black Body (1997) and Loretta J. Ross’ (1998) work on 
African American women’s reproductive rights activism provide some of 
the best analyses of the complexities of reproductive rights and activism 
for Black women. As a scholar, I respect and agree with these interroga-
tions into the limitations and circumscriptions of “choice.” As a provider, 
however, I also recognize that circumscribed choices are still choices; to 
suggest that only a full range of options equals “choice” not only detracts 
from women’s attempts to empower themselves as much as possible but 
also buys into the commodification of pregnancy and childbearing. Poor 
women, women of color, young women, and women in very difficult living 
situations make decisions based on the choices available to them, deci-
sions made often with full awareness of the systems of power, privilege, 
and oppression that circumscribe those choices, as Ross demonstrates in 
her work (1998).
The D&X procedure I observed that day seemed interminable compared 
to the first-trimester procedures to which I had already become accus-
tomed. First-trimester procedures usually last less than five minutes; the 
22-week D&X procedure took more than twenty minutes. The woman 
was awake and alert during her abortion (we did not have the technology 
at that time to offer sedation) as her advocate talked her through it: “I want 
you to take a slow deep breath, and as I count, breathe out completely. As 
we do this, you will feel a lot of pressure.” After the procedure was over, 
I went into the surgery lab, where each surgery’s fetal tissue is checked to 
insure completion of the procedure. The advocate trainer was checking 
tissue that day, and the fully intact fetus, looking like a tiny baby, lay in 
a glass dish, lighted from beneath. I drew my breath sharply. The trainer 
took my hand and said, “Sometimes, I see these little ones and I am sad 
for them. I don’t believe it’s just ‘tissue’ at this stage.” She reminded me 
that the woman who chose this abortion had really good reasons for not 
trying to parent this child, and it would be better for her entire family 
if this little one were not a part of their lives right now. Then she said, 
“Sometimes, patients ask me to baptize their fetuses, so I do. I sprinkle 
them with just a little water and wish them safely into the next world.” 
I was surprised and asked if she were religious. “Not like that,” she said, 
“but I am spiritual and I believe I am doing spiritual work at the clinic.” 
Then, she gave me some rubber gloves and left me alone with the fetal 
body for a couple of minutes. On November 5, 2003, President George W. 
Bush signed the “Partial-Birth Abortion Ban” into law, making illegal the 
D&X procedure that I witnessed that day. Now, by law, 22-week abor-
tion procedures either put women through prolonged labor and delivery 
or result in dismembered fetal bodies. Since the majority of late-second-
trimester abortions involve women living in poverty, young women, and 
women in difficult living situations, this law disproportionately affects 
the most vulnerable of our patients.
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Mine is a story of the fetus that is not a part of the current public 
discourse of U.S. abortion politics, although its telling is inspired by the 
powerful history of abortion-related consciousness-raising in U.S. femi-
nist politics. I offer this story as a contribution to the ongoing feminist 
conversation about what happens in abortion politics when the fetus and 
the pregnant woman are separated from one another in a process of dis-
cursive rupture, and women’s embodied experiences are excised from the 
public discussion of abortion. Feminist analyses of abortion politics in the 
past twenty years note that they break down into a dichotomization of 
“fetus” from “woman” or, from an anti-abortion perspective, “mother” 
from “child,” at best, a reductive way to think about a very complex issue 
(Petchesky 1987, Hartouni 1992, Stabile 1992, Taylor 1992, Balsamo 1996, 
Berlant 1997, Michaels 1999, and Stabile 1999). As many of these schol-
ars demonstrate, this reductive approach has played a role in the gradual 
diminishment of support for and access to abortion in the United States. 
My own point of entry into this conversation is located at the intersection 
of my ten years’ experience as an abortion clinic employee and my work 
as a feminist academic, a location that provides me with a perspective 
from which to analyze the discourse of abortion and its relationship both 
to women’s lived experiences with abortion and to the political limits on 
abortion.
In this paper, I begin with the unbridgeable discursive gap that charac-
terizes the U.S. abortion debate. Within the context of this debate, women 
are losing—not only through changes in Supreme Court membership and 
recent legislation (including the complete ban on all abortions passed in 
South Dakota and pending in my own state of Ohio in 2006), but also 
through the gradual decrease of the number of doctors trained or willing 
to perform abortions and the more rapid loss of public support for abor-
tion rights. I argue that a more accurate understanding of abortion, which 
includes a full range of women’s relationships to their fetuses and how 
these various relationships shape individual abortion experiences, has 
been elided by the dichotomization of abortion politics. As a 2005 New 
York Times article explains, “While public conversation about abortion 
is dominated by advocates with all-or-nothing positions . . . most patients 
at [abortion] clinic[s], like most Americans, f[i]nd themselves on rockier 
ground” (Leland 2005). This rockier ground is epitomized by the situations 
that I examine in this paper: later-term second-trimester abortions and the 
“Partial Birth Abortion Ban,” and women’s experiences of connection to 
fetuses they choose to abort.
Cultural attention to these situations has been superseded by attention 
to the strategies used by abortion rights activists to counter anti-abortion 
contentions, strategies that have actually served to strengthen the dichoto-
mizations central to abortion politics rather than to complicate our under-
standing of abortion in the United States. In the current cultural context, 
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what is at stake in my analysis is nothing less than the maintenance and 
reclamation of women’s access to a range of abortion options, via a fuller, 
more complete representation of our lived experiences with abortion. 
This more complete representation will challenge the absolutism of “the 
abortion debate,” showing abortion experiences to be more complex and 
more nuanced than generally acknowledged by those on either side of that 
debate. If this more complex understanding of abortion experiences were 
to become an element of our public abortion debate, I assert, it would be 
much more difficult for anti-abortion activists to proffer simplistic solu-
tions to what they sometimes call “the abortion problem.” This more 
complex understanding of abortion experiences also complicates, and in 
some ways challenges, the strategies that feminists have developed to 
counter anti-abortion discourse; for this reason, my contribution to the 
discourse is risky.2 This is, however, a risk that must be taken, and one 
that has already been broached in the movement.
In the Winter 2004/2005 issue of Conscience, Frances Kissling, founder 
of Catholics for a Free Choice, made waves in the abortion rights move-
ment by calling for activists to attend to questions and concerns related 
to the fetus. In “Is There Life after Roe? How to Think About the Fetus,” 
Kissling argues “that the pro-choice movement must acknowledge the 
moral value of a fetus—and the potentially painful reality of its loss” 
(Traister 2005). She acknowledges the historical context of the dichotomi-
zation of fetuses and women in U.S. abortion discourse: “It has long been 
a truism of the abortion debate that those who are prochoice have rights 
and those who are against legal abortion have morality; that those who 
support abortion rights concentrate on women and those opposed focus 
on the fetus” (Kissling 2004/2005, 8). But now, Kissling argues, we need 
to work toward “the development of an abortion praxis that combine[s] 
respect for the fundamental right of women to choose abortion with an 
ethical discourse that include[s] the exploration of how other values might 
also be respected, including the value of developing human life,” thus 
moving beyond the rather simplistic dichotomies that have characterized 
U.S. abortion discourse (2004/2005, 2).
The responses to Kissling’s article have been strong and swift. Anti-
abortion responses predictably charge inconsistency: a Free Republic com-
mentary is titled “The New Line of Pro-Choice: ‘Saying it’s wrong makes 
it right’ ” (Vanderleun 2005), clearly reinscribing the dichotomy, while 
John Mallon (2005), contributing editor to Inside the Vatican, posits that 
Kissling’s article was evidence of “Cracks in the Wall.” Less predictable, 
perhaps, have been the responses of some abortion rights activist leaders. 
In The Village Voice, Ellie Smeal of the Feminist Majority Foundation 
accuses Kissling of diverting the abortion debate to issues that are less 
important than “putting the right wing on the defensive” and of simplify-
ing the issue of abortion by talking only about potential sadness. “I don’t 
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hear her saying that there’s joy sometimes,” Smeal is quoted as saying. 
“I think if an 11-year-old is pregnant, it’s a great relief for her to have an 
abortion” (Lerner 2004). Smeal’s example is problematically simplistic; 
my own abortion at age 23 was a great relief, and I have worked with many 
very young patients who, although they were strong in their determination 
that abortion was the best choice for them, felt sad or ambivalent about 
making that choice. Smeal’s charge that Kissling ignores the “joy” in turn 
ignores the fact that much feminist discourse around abortion empha-
sizes its benefits to the exclusion of its complexities. Later, in Salon.com, 
Smeal denies that Kissling’s argument is new. “Frances is not changing 
the discussion . . . we are focused on keeping women’s fundamental rights 
for reasons of her survival. Of course we are moral, feeling people” (Tra-
ister 2005). In fact, Smeal argues that the focus on what is perceived to 
be “new” in Kissling’s argument may be the result of an attempt by “the 
press” “to start infighting on the liberal side” (Traister 2005).
Like Smeal, Susan Hill, president of the National Women’s Health 
Organization, accuses Kissling of diverting attention away from where 
the movement needs to be focused—on women. She says, “It’s so frus-
trating to hear people discussing the fetus but not discussing the woman” 
(Traister 2005). Hill’s response, like Smeal’s, is reductive and reinscribes 
the dichotomy of fetus/woman that Kissling is clearly trying to challenge. 
Surely, in Kissling’s call for “combin[ing] respect” for women’s right to 
choose with “exploration[s]” of the “value of developing human life” 
is an explicit consideration of both fetus and woman, not fetus at the 
expense of woman. And Rosalind Petchesky, one of the most respected 
and prolific scholars on abortion rights, has reportedly sent Kissling an 
e-mail response. “If and when those who dominate anti-abortion politics 
could for a minute take seriously the rights to a decent life and health of 
born children,” the e-mail says, “maybe then we could start to talk about 
advancing respect for fetal life, early or late” (Lerner 2004). Petchesky’s 
response demonstrates the challenge to the abortion rights movement 
posed by deconstructing the dichotomies that characterize the abortion 
debate in the United States.
At the same time, it is very possible that Smeal’s concerns about 
attempts to portray the movement as conflicted are correct. I could find 
only one prominent activist organization leader quoted in the media 
speaking positively of Kissling’s argument. Lerner briefly quotes Joan 
Malin, CEO of Planned Parenthood of New York City, as acknowledging 
that the consideration Kissling asks for is already happening on the private 
level for most women. She says, “I have never seen a woman take the 
decision lightly” (Lerner 2004). More recently, I have found a consonant 
message on the website of the National Coalition of Abortion Providers 
(NCAP), which is constructing a linked page call “heartssite.com” whose 
purpose is “to make the American public more tolerant and comfortable 
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with abortion, with the ultimate goal being the elimination of the abortion 
stigma” (NCAP 2005), by collecting individuals’ stories about their expe-
riences—joyful and fraught—with abortion. The abortion rights activists’ 
responses to Kissling’s article, although surprising, are hardly inconsistent 
with the history of abortion discourse in the United States. As Smeal says, 
“The polls have been the same for 30 years . . . And in reality, so is the 
debate” (Traister 2005).
In this paper, I argue that Frances Kissling is on to something: hidden 
in the gap of the U.S. abortion debate is the relationship between woman 
and fetus, a relationship that many women consider seriously when they 
choose abortion, a relationship that is not honored by a legal mandate that 
late second-trimester procedures dismember the fetal body. Based on my 
experiences as an abortion clinic employee, I claim a role of witness to this 
relationship—sometimes characterized by connection and sometimes by 
distance—in order to demonstrate that Kissling’s challenge that we attend 
to the fetus is correct, and also that, in the clinic where I work (and in 
many other abortion clinics), this attention is already a powerful force. In 
my role as witness, I can be accountable to Smeal’s request for the stories 
of joy and Petchesky’s call to take seriously the rights to life and health of 
the already-born—I see and work toward both on a regular basis, both in 
the clinic and in my other activist work. As I integrate an examination of 
my own experiences working in the clinic with an analysis of the language 
of and responses to the “Partial Birth Abortion Ban,” I will show that the 
discourses surrounding the ban are illustrative of the larger conversation 
around U.S. abortion politics. Finally, I will explain why the ban demon-
strates not the concern for the fetus that its proponents claim but, rather, 
a clear disdain for any connection that a woman choosing abortion might 
feel for her fetus.
Descriptions of my work with patients serve to reinsert women’s experi-
ences into abortion discourse and challenge the notion that in abortion poli-
tics we are forced to choose between pregnant women and their potential 
babies. I offer this analysis in response to the recent exhortations not only of 
Frances Kissling but also of several feminist scholars that we in the abortion 
rights movement seriously consider the fetus (Duden 1993, Franklin 1999, 
Oaks 1999, Hartouni 1999, and Shrage 2003). Like Laurie Shrage, I strive 
to introduce into abortion discourse representations of the fetus that serve 
to “appropriat[e] the ‘managed fetus’ for subversive purposes” (2003, 127); 
however, unlike Shrage, I am interested in the images and discussions that 
already circulate in U.S. abortion practice in the clinic.3 Like Kissling, I 
think we should consider the fetus’ place in women’s abortion experiences, 
not iconicize it. I will focus on second trimester abortion, to demonstrate 
the correlation between the power of the woman/fetus dichotomy and the 
political and social success of the “Partial Birth Abortion Ban.” My analysis 
is organized around activist slogans in order to illustrate, simultaneously, 
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how those slogans relates to and extends the popular discourse around 
abortion and how reductive that popular discourse ultimately is. It is my 
intention to show that the real and complex abortion experiences of women 
extend beyond the limits of the debate and thus simultaneously embody 
“pro-life” and “pro-choice” values.
It’s a Child, Not a Choice
One of the most popular anti-abortion bumper stickers in my region of 
the Midwest features a line drawing of a fetus surrounded by an amni-
otic sac next to the phrase, “It’s a Child, not a Choice.” This sentiment, 
which illustrates perfectly the fetus/woman dichotomy, effectively defines 
fetal personhood and claims the fetus as a symbol of anti-choice politics. 
Because the assignation of personhood to the fetus is a common trope 
in mainstream anti-abortion discourse, Kissling’s assertion that “those 
opposed (to abortion) focus on the fetus” may actually be an understate-
ment. I have found that, in activist discourse, the figure of the fetus 
belongs to anti-abortionists, for whom it has been a source of considerable 
strength. The anti-abortion movement began utilizing images of the fetal 
body in 1973, immediately after Roe v. Wade. The abortion rights move-
ment’s response to these images has primarily been to divert attention 
away from the fetus and onto women’s rights, as in “woman’s right to 
choose” or a woman’s right to her own bodily integrity. Of course these are 
important considerations, particularly within the context of a society that 
romanticizes motherhood but does not honor mothering, especially moth-
ering by poor women, women of color, and young women. However, the 
inevitable result of this diversion has been an almost complete excision of 
the fetus from abortion rights discourse and the simultaneous association 
of representations of the fetus with anti-abortion discourses.
This association reaches its ultimate expression in the language of the 
“Partial Birth Abortion Ban,” which George W. Bush signed into law on 
November 5, 2003, setting historical precedent by outlawing an elective 
medical procedure not because it was scientifically proven to be unsafe, 
but because it was deemed by politicians to be disturbing. Although the 
ban was put under appeal by several state and local actions immediately 
upon its passage, and remains under appeal as I revise this article, it was 
celebrated as a victory for anti-abortion politics. Sen. George Voinovich 
(R., Ohio) is quoted as claiming triumphantly, “[t]oday is a glorious day . . . 
We can now begin to save human lives” (McFeatters 2003). “Partial birth 
abortion” is a label chosen by politicians that serves to increase people’s 
discomfort with a procedure that is more appropriately known as “Intact 
Dilation and Evacuation” (Intact D&E) or more commonly “Dilation and 
Extraction” (D&X). Descriptions of this procedure have become part of our 
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cultural discourse of abortion. Carol Mason demonstrates that the phrase 
“partial birth” is intended to counter the statement in Roe “that a fetus 
is not a person.” Although unborn fetuses may not be persons, those in 
the process of being born are not unborn and, therefore, are not designated 
by Roe as not-persons (2002, 81). I have found this fine distinction to be 
reflected in the language of the 2003 congressional findings of the Partial 
Birth Abortion Ban Act.
The congressional findings—a record of the congressional hearings and 
fact-finding that inform the debates around an act that may eventually 
become a law—emphasize that in this procedure, the fetus is “inches from 
being born” and deemphasize the number of weeks between the procedure 
and the fetus’ possible viability. For example, following the language of 
the findings, even a 20-week fetus with no chance of surviving outside of 
the womb for at least six more weeks, even with extensive technomedi-
cal intervention, is “only inches from being” a child, a sentiment that 
reinforces the public discourse that the fetuses being aborted in D&X 
procedures are “almost children.” For instance, in an opinion piece in 
the National Law Journal, Jay Sekulow, chief counsel to the American 
Center for Law and Justice, characterizes the procedure as on the border 
between the born and the unborn: “Partial-birth procedures represent the 
beachhead of abortion’s assault on postnatal life, the bridge between abor-
tion and infanticide. Partial-birth procedures open the way to legal infan-
ticide.” Sekulow notes that the next incarnation of the Supreme Court 
“could conclude that a human being who is partially outside the mother’s 
body is a person entitled to the equal protection of the law” (2004, 26). 
Sekulow does not examine the extent to which the law should—or could—
protect a 20-week fetus, without functioning lungs or nervous system, 
who is “partially outside the mother’s body.”
Both the ban itself, as signed into law, and the congressional findings 
in the initial act begin with short descriptions of the procedure that is 
banned. Because the two descriptions are not identical, a comparative 
examination of their language can expose the underlying assumptions 
behind the ban. For example, in the language of the law, when “the person 
performing the abortion” (who is not named as a physician or health care 
professional) is invoked, the object of the sentence is a “living fetus,” 
implying that the abortion is performed on the fetus, that the fetus is the 
patient rather than the woman having the abortion. In addition, when 
the woman on whom the abortion actually is being performed is invoked, 
she is referred to as “the body of the mother.” This is a clear example not 
only of a discursive separation of a fetus from the body that must sustain 
it, but also an inversion of personhood status, so that the fetus becomes 
the person (patient) and the pregnant woman becomes a “body,” relegated 
to the status of vessel. Thus, according to the language of the ban that 
President Bush signed into law, a “partial-birth abortion” is one in which
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(A) the person performing the abortion deliberately and intentionally vaginally 
delivers a living fetus until, in the case of a head-first presentation, the entire 
fetal head is outside the body of the mother, or, in the case of breech presenta-
tion, any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother, 
for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person knows will kill the 
partially delivered living fetus; and (B) performs the overt act, other than com-
pletion of delivery, that kills the partially delivered living fetus. (“Partial-Birth 
Abortion Ban Act,” SEC. 3, Chapter 74, Sec. 1531, b1AB, 2003)4
In comparison to the language of the ban as signed into law, that of the 
congressional findings describes the procedure as
an abortion in which a physician deliberately and intentionally vaginally deliv-
ers a living, unborn child’s body until either the entire baby’s head is outside the 
body of the mother, or any part of the baby’s trunk past the navel is outside the 
body of the mother and only the head remains in the womb, for the purpose of 
performing an overt act (usually the puncturing of the back of the child’s skull 
and removing the baby’s brains) that the person knows will kill the partially 
delivered living infant, performs this act, and then completes delivery of the 
dead infant— . . . a gruesome and inhumane procedure that is never medi-
cally necessary and should be prohibited. (“Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act,” 
Congressional Findings SEC. 2, (1), 2003)
Most notable in this description, which presumably informed congres-
sional debates surrounding the passage of the bill, is the language used to 
name the fetus. Although the ban consistently refers to “the fetus,” the 
congressional findings uses language that most U.S. citizens associate 
with either the successful completion of a pregnancy or with anti-abortion 
discourse—“unborn child,” “baby,” “child,” and “infant”—to refer to the 
fetus. The connotative difference between the two descriptions is obvious 
when we read them together; “fetus” is a less emotionally-charged term 
than “baby,” “child” or “infant,” all of which confer personhood on the 
fetus. The phrase “dead infant” serves to “mobilize a desire to protect” the 
fetus—to personalize the abortion procedure and the fetus, in a manner 
similar to anti-abortion photos of fetuses in utero, as Lauren Berlant has 
argued (1997, 110).
At the same time, the language of the findings designates the “person 
performing the abortion” to be a “physician,” while the language of the 
law uses the longer descriptor; it is important to note that the language 
of the findings preceded the language of the law. Therefore, the shift from 
“physician” in the act and findings to “person performing the abortion” 
in the actual law would make the ban applicable to abortions performed 
by physicians’ assistants (and by non-medical personnel) as well as by 
physicians. In addition, the findings describes in some detail (and in 
evocative language) what the ban names more generally the “overt act 
that the person knows will kill” the fetus. The detailed and evocative 
description in the findings could limit the scope of the ban, while the more 
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general description in the ban would insure that the law is applicable to 
a broader range of abortion procedures. If, for example, a physician were 
able to determine that another act (besides intrauterine cranial decompres-
sion) could lead to a successful intact removal of the fetal body through 
a woman’s partially-dilated cervix, the intact abortion procedure which 
utilized that act might not be covered by the description in the congres-
sional findings, but it could be covered by the law as it was passed. And, 
of course, the findings’ phrase, “gruesome and inhumane procedure,” is 
inappropriate for inclusion in a law, although its strategic utility in the 
congressional findings cannot be overstated.
The shifts from the language used in the act’s congressional findings 
to the language used in the ban—from specific to general descriptions 
and from emotion-laden names for the fetus to more neutral medical 
terminology—are evidence that the law contains traces of anti-abortion 
discourse. In addition, the language of the ban indicates a shift in anti-
abortion discourse, from a pornography of images of dismemberment to a 
pornography of descriptive discourse. The language of the ban both relies 
on and perpetuates the assignation of personhood to the fetus in service 
to the ultimate goal of ending all abortions. In fact, Matt Trewhella, of 
Missionaries to the Preborn, explains in Life Advocate how the Partial 
Birth Abortion Ban could lead to the prohibition of abortion, by reveal-
ing “pro-abortion legislators” to be “brutes,” thereby “causing them to 
be unseated” (NARAL 2005). Even Randall Terry, founder of Operation 
Rescue, admits in a news release in September 2003 (only two months 
before the ban was signed into law), that the ban was “a political scam” 
that “may not save one child’s life” but, because of the public debate 
surrounding the bill, it is “a public relations goldmine” (NARAL 2005).
These activists, whose efforts to sway public opinion about this particu-
lar procedure began almost ten years before the bill was signed into law, 
clearly perceive the ban to be a political victory for anti-abortion forces. 
The response from abortion rights activists has been less emphatic. Many 
decry the ban’s prohibition against a medical procedure, but few, if any, 
have taken up the cause of defending the D&X procedure from charges that 
it is “gruesome and inhumane.” In addition, the lukewarm responses of 
abortion rights activists, organizations, and scholars to the ban have served 
not to deconstruct the woman/fetus dichotomy but, rather, to broaden the 
discursive gap that characterizes U.S. abortion discourse.
“My Body, My Choice”
A popular slogan among abortion rights advocates in my region is “My 
Body, My Choice,” a slogan that serves as an illustration of what Kissling 
critiques as the “prochoice movement’s” unwavering focus on women’s 
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legal—and sometimes abstract—right to choose. She notes, “This often 
means a reluctance to even consider whether or not fetal life has value, 
or . . . attempt to define that value or to see how it can be promoted 
with restricting access to legal abortion” (2). In the slogan “My Body, 
My Choice,” as in much abortion rights discourse, the fetus is invisible, 
excised by fears that discussions of the fetus and of women’s varied rela-
tionships to their fetuses will lead inevitably to anti-abortion sentiment. 
If, as Kissling argues, the “prochoice movement” has been too focused on 
women’s right to choose (perhaps to its own detriment), our reasons were 
certainly understandable.
The abortion rights movement’s early responses to the issue of fetal 
personhood were diversionary: countering images of “dead fetuses” with 
images of “dead women.” The most famous of these were Gerri Twerdy 
Santoro in the early 1970s (died from illegal abortion induced by her boy-
friend, in 1964), Rosie Jiménez in the late 1970s (died in 1977 of an illegal 
abortion after passage of the Hyde Amendment made it impossible for 
her to afford a legal abortion), and Becky Bell in the late 1980s (died from 
an illegal abortion in 1988 after Indiana’s parental consent laws led her 
to choose illegal abortion over disappointing her parents). These women’s 
tragic stories served to balance the mangled fetal bodies that increasingly 
became a staple of anti-abortion discourse. In the 1990s, in order to palliate 
its message for a backlash-educated audience that was increasingly wary 
of feminism, abortion rights discourse became a more abstract discourse 
of “choice,” rights, and policies rather than an embodied discourse.
When I began working at the clinic in 1996, activist discourse named 
women “private citizens,” not mothers, lovers, or daughters, and the fetus 
was called a “pregnancy,” if it was invoked at all. While this approach 
served to divert attention away from anti-abortion images of dismem-
bered fetuses, it also diverted abortion rights activism and theory away 
from women’s lived experiences of pregnancy and abortion and, in many 
ways, failed to provide real women with accurate representations of our 
experiences.
More recently, some abortion rights activists have argued that anti-
abortion images of the fetus are all inaccurate, a denial response that actu-
ally solidifies the dichotomization of woman/fetus. Based on my work in 
the clinic, I can witness to the fact that some anti-abortion fetal images 
and descriptions are indeed inaccurate and often racist. For instance, our 
state-mandated “informed consent” information includes a full-color 
booklet on fetal development whose images resemble Lennart Nilsson’s 
fetal photographs, famously published on the cover of Life magazine 
in 1965. These Life-like fetal images have been computer-enhanced to 
resemble white babies, including eyebuds colorized to look blue, and skin 
colorized to look light pink. The famous anti-abortion film Silent Scream 
constructs an incredible story of a nine-week fetus with consciousness and 
Sometimes, It’s a Child and a Choice 37
ability to experience pain during abortion, even though researchers who 
are convinced that fetal pain is possible estimate that the earliest gesta-
tional stage at which this is a risk is 20 weeks and a JAMA clinical review 
article, “Fetal Pain: A Systemic Multidisciplinary Review of the Evidence” 
finds that the more plausible stage is 29–30 weeks LMP (Anand 2004, Lee, 
et al, 2005). Other representations of the fetus are just plain silly, such as 
those ubiquitous on-line poems, written in the “voice” of a fetus, ending 
with statements like “today, my mommy killed me.”
Just as often, however, anti-abortion fetal images are not inherently 
inaccurate. One of the earliest anti-abortion images I can remember 
seeing was the “tiny feet” poster, which shows two tiny feet with toes, 
looking almost fully-developed; in the clinic where I work, a technician 
measures the fully-formed feet from each fetal body over 9 weeks LMP, 
confirming fetal age and development in the context of ascertaining the 
successful completion of the procedure. And anti-abortion advertising 
often uses photos that resemble Nilsson’s to draw attention to fetal devel-
opment in addition to their popular photos of dismembered fetuses. What 
I have found is that these photos do look like fetuses we see in our clinic, 
although the gestational ages of the fetuses in the photos are often under-
stated by two-to-four weeks, giving the impression, for example, that the 
photo of a ten-week fetus is instead a photo of a seven- or eight-week fetus. 
In fact, a fetus as young as 9 weeks LMP can have tiny, fully-formed feet, 
and a fetus at sixteen weeks can indeed (as a particular anti-abortion ad 
says) “make a fist, get hiccups and suck her thumb.” Accuracy of an image 
should not, however, be read as indication of the image’s political inno-
cence. Ultimately, I agree with feminist scholars who argue that there are 
no “innocent” images of the fetus (Stabile 1999, Taylor 1992, Petchesky 
1987, Berlant 1997, Hartouni 1992, 1999 and Balsamo 1996). As Stabile 
reminds us, we ignore the politics behind images to our own disadvantage. 
Even seemingly innocuous images of the fetus, she notes, are implicated 
in “the massive infrastructure behind the anti-abortion movement’s pro-
paganda” (1999, 135). I argue that the abortion rights activist movement’s 
reticence to engage in discussions of the fetal body has left the door open 
for all uses of fetal imagery to be read as anti-abortion.
Just as abortion rights activists’ responses to anti-abortion imagery tend 
either to divert or deny—to divert attention away from the unpleasant 
claims associated with those images or to deny the anti-abortion images 
that are representational of the fetus—so have our responses to the Partial 
Birth Abortion Ban. When the ban was first introduced to the U.S. public 
in 1993, anti-abortion activists began with a media blitz of misinformation 
and disgust-mongering. The now-famous images of the procedure (particu-
larly of the intrauterine cranial decompression) were placed in newspaper 
ads, in brochures and on-line. Under a headline asking, “Do these drawings 
shock you?” the ad warns, “We are sorry, but we think you should know 
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the truth.” Beneath this declaration is a column of line-drawn images 
juxtaposed with exaggerated and inflammatory textual descriptions of the 
D&X abortion procedure (Gianelli 1993, 3). As these ads were more widely 
distributed, leaders of the abortion rights movement were asked to com-
ment on the procedure. Almost immediately, the responses became deni-
als. The National Abortion Federation (NAF) first said that the procedure 
was only performed on women whose fetuses were already dead (Gianelli 
1993, 21); Barbara Radford, then-head of NAF, retracted this claim almost 
immediately. The next response was that the procedure was rare; NAF 
claimed that late-second trimester and third-trimester abortions were very 
rare and that only “a handful of doctors” used the D&X procedure (Gianelli 
1993, 21). Although the Allan Guttmacher Institute estimates that fewer 
than two percent of abortions in the United States are performed after 
the twentieth week of pregnancy, anti-abortion activists argue that, with 
an annual abortion rate of nearly 1.3 million per year, two percent equals 
approximately 26,000 abortions performed after 20 weeks LMP, when 
D&X would most likely be used (2005). Gianelli reports that in the 1990s 
“doctors who use the (D&X) technique acknowledged doing thousands of 
such procedures a year . . . the majority . . . on healthy fetuses and healthy 
women,” and that at one facility alone, almost 1500 D&X procedures were 
performed in one year. Another physician, in Nebraska, reported that he 
performed about 500 D&X procedures a year (1997, 54–5).
Both of the claims made by abortion rights activists, that D&X was 
used rarely and largely in cases of fetal anomaly or death, entered public 
discourse before they were effectively retracted. In 1995, Ron Fitzsim-
mons, head of NCAP, said on Nightline that “the procedure was used 
rarely and only on women whose lives were in danger or whose fetuses 
were damaged” (Stout 1997, A11). Two years later in a statement that 
made headlines, Fitzsimmons admitted he “lied through [his] teeth” in 
that interview. But the damage was done; while vetoing an early ver-
sion of the ban in 1996, President Clinton invoked the information that 
the procedure was rare and only performed in extreme circumstances. 
He vetoed the law on behalf of “a few hundred women every year who 
have personally agonizing situations where their children are . . . about 
to be born with terrible deformities” (Stout 1997, A11). This campaign 
of misinformation, of denial, has been embarrassing for abortion rights 
activists. Although Ron Fitzsimmons is quoted in the New York Times 
article as saying that he “continue[s] to support the procedure and abor-
tion rights in general” (Stout 1997, A11), a mere week later, he is quoted 
in American Medical News as saying that the abortion rights movement 
should “roll over and play dead” regarding the ban, rather than trying to 
fight it. He says, “We’re fighting a bill that has the support of, what, 78% 
of the public? That tells me that we have a PR problem” (Gianelli 1997, 
55). Fitzsimmons is right, there is a public relations problem regarding 
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D&X, and his initial denial responses—as well as those of other pro-choice 
activists—have played a significant role in creating that problem. If these 
activists had not made statements about the procedure that were judged 
untrue, and instead explained why the procedure was safer than the late- 
term dismemberment procedures that have now replaced it, then anti-
abortion claims about the procedure would not have been strengthened 
by a loss of credibility in the abortion rights movement. In fact, when 
Fitzsimmons’ admission came to light, President Clinton backpedaled on 
his veto, saying he was opposed to “using the procedure on healthy women 
with healthy fetuses”: a White House spokesperson is quoted as saying, 
“if this procedure is being used on an elective basis, where there’s another 
procedure available, the president would be happy to sign legislation that 
would ban it” (Padawer 1997).
Although anti-abortion organizations continued to target D&X in their 
activism and imagery and several state-level laws banning D&X were in 
courts in the late 1990s, the national public discourse around the proce-
dure died down in 1997, until 2002 when it became clear that President 
Bush was poised to sign a ban into law. At that time, the major abortion 
rights organizations and their leaders reverted to diversion, a familiar 
tactic within the movement, historically. Even now, when the ban is 
invoked, the standard response from the Planned Parenthood Federation 
of America, NARAL/Pro-Choice America, the National Abortion Federa-
tion, and other national abortion rights organizations is to focus on privacy 
and, still, on stories of extreme cases. The federal government, they assert, 
should not be making medical decisions for women.
This, of course, is true, but it does not address the claims, now common 
in public discourse, that D&X is cruel and inhumane, nor does it explain 
why D&X became such a widely-used procedure in the first place. The 
reason these two issues are not addressed by abortion rights advocates is 
directly related to the movement’s reticence, as recognized by Kissling, 
to engage in discourse about the fetus. The ban clearly increases limita-
tions on women’s rights to control fertility and choose parenthood; it sets 
a dangerous precedent by making illegal a safe, effective, elective medi-
cal procedure; and it represents a reassertion of patriarchal power over, 
particularly, the most vulnerable women’s bodies. Of course, the abor-
tion rights response is not inaccurate; it is merely incomplete and thus 
ineffective in the public arena.
The U.S. attorney who is defending the ban in a New York appeal has 
argued that “this procedure is never in the best interest of the mother” 
(Edwards 2003). This statement is baldly incorrect; there are reasons why 
D&X is sometimes in the best interest of the patient, but presenting these 
reasons requires abortion rights activists to speak honestly about pregnant 
women’s varied relationships to their fetuses as well as about the fetal 
body. The D&X procedure was developed by Dr. Martin Haskell, an Ohio 
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physician, and first presented at a 1992 meeting of the National Abortion 
Federation, a trade association of abortion providers (Haskell 1992, see 
also Gianelli 1993).
The procedure was promoted to solve a problem common to late 
second-trimester suction abortions. In standard suction abortions, the 
fetal body falls apart, is dismembered. During the second trimester of 
pregnancy, the fetus’ bone tissue begins to harden from a cartilage-like 
state into bone. One of the most dangerous complications of a late second-
trimester suction abortion for the patient is that the uterine wall might 
be lacerated or perforated by fetal bone tissue, in severe cases potentially 
necessitating hysterectomy. If the fetus is removed intact, no sharp bony 
edges are exposed, and perforation is thus avoided. One way to accomplish 
intact removal is via induction abortion—basically induced labor—a pro-
cedure almost like childbirth, much longer in duration and often more 
expensive and more painful than suction procedures. The D&X procedure 
is a compromise that combines the relatively quick (usually less than 
thirty minutes) duration of a suction procedure with the decreased risk of 
perforation provided by intact removal.5
I have attended women having these procedures; the woman has typi-
cally been under a very light anesthesia (often called “twilight sleep”—
awake and responsive, but woozy and relaxed), is able to walk with support 
immediately after the procedure, and is often fully alert and comfortable 
within an hour or a little more. In the mid-1990s, before we had the equip-
ment necessary for anesthetization, all our D&X patients underwent the 
procedure with local anesthesia and the assistance of a patient advocate 
trained in relaxation techniques. These patients were able to drive them-
selves home from the clinic after their recovery time. Therefore, one 
benefit of the D&X procedure is that it provides a level of patient safety 
and comfort for late second-trimester abortions that is not available with 
most other methods—methods that involve either surgery on the uterus, 
protracted contractions and delivery, or the dismemberment of the fetus 
and an increased risk of uterine laceration or perforation. The fact that 
dismemberment procedures (surely “gruesome” in their own right) are 
not prohibited by the ban suggests that the incentive behind the ban is 
not to protect women (or fetuses) from that which is cruel but, rather, to 
subject women who choose second trimester abortion to increased dis-
comfort (and greater risk) than they would experience with the safer, more 
comfortable D&X procedure.
Another benefit of D&X is emotional. Many of the women I have 
known who chose abortion during the second half of the second trimes-
ter experienced some ambiguity around their decisions: nationally, about 
ten percent choose to abort a previously-wanted pregnancy in the second 
trimester because of changes in family situation (divorce, chronic illness 
of another child, loss of employment, etc.), about two percent choose to 
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abort a wanted fetus that has developed health complications with which 
the family is not prepared to cope, and almost half undergo a late abor-
tion because the woman was financially or emotionally unprepared for an 
abortion earlier in the pregnancy (Allan Guttmacher Institute 2005). In any 
of these cases, the woman may have developed emotional connections to 
the fetus growing inside her. In these situations, it can be beneficial to the 
woman (and often to her family) to have an opportunity, post-procedure, 
to hold her fetus’ body, to say goodbye to her baby, to grieve for a child 
rather than for a mass of dismembered tissue. I know women who have 
been allowed to spend time with their intact aborted fetuses’ bodies, and 
they feel that this time was important to their healing in a difficult—and 
chosen—situation.
When faced with questions about this “gruesome” procedure, abor-
tion rights leaders have been disappointingly weak in its defense. Why 
did these activists fail to explain the physical and emotional benefits of 
D&X procedures when the ban was being debated in the public arena? In 
order to do so, they would have had to speak honestly about the fetal body 
and some pregnant women’s relationships to their fetuses. As Frances 
Kissling has so eloquently argued, this is not a discussion abortion rights 
activists have been able to engage in to date, in spite of repeated calls by 
some feminist theorists that we do so. She argues, “For some the right to 
choose abortion seems to include the right to be protected from thinking 
about the fetus and from any pain that might result from others’ talking 
about the fetus in value-laden terms” (2004/2005, 3). If we in the abortion 
rights movement would only speak honestly about the fetus and practice 
an embodied abortion praxis, we would be able to insist on the legality of 
this procedure, not because it is rare and necessary, but because it makes 
the abortion experiences of all women, regardless of age, class, or living 
situation, safer and more comfortable, as they should be.
Pro Child Pro Choice
Another popular slogan used by abortion rights advocates is the seemingly 
simple “Pro Child Pro Choice.” Although it may be read as reinscribing 
the dichotomies that characterize the abortion debate, including the 
dichotomization of fetus from woman, of child from autonomous choice, 
and the construct “pro child” echoes with traces of “pro-natalism,” this 
slogan does come closer than most to providing a deconstruction of the 
dichotomies that shape the abortion debate. As with any deconstruction, 
the key to understanding the relationship between the dichotomized 
terms is in the gap between the terms. If anti-abortion discourse effec-
tively “aborts” the woman’s body from their descriptions of the fetus and, 
as Frances Kissling suggests, “the conventional wisdom in the prochoice 
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movement has been that talking about fetal life is counterproductive” 
(2004/5, 4), then the varied relationships with their fetuses that women 
describe, and discursively produce, have been relegated to the gap between 
these political poles. As Linda Layne writes about feminist responses 
to miscarriage (which doctors call “spontaneous abortion”), “feminists 
have avoided any discussion of fetuses for fear of adding fuel to the anti-
abortionists’ fire” (1999, 251). Layne proposes that in order to open the 
discourse of pregnancy to the experiences of all women, feminists should 
“focus on the iterative process by which individuals and their social 
networks materially and socially produce (or opt not to produce) a new 
member of the community” (252). In other words, Layne challenges us to 
recognize that the distinction between a fetus and a baby is defined not by 
gestational development but through social relationships—the pregnant 
woman’s with her fetus, her family, and her community—whether the 
pregnancy ends in childbirth or miscarriage or, I would add, abortion.
The powerful work of Judith Arcana, both her poetry in the recently 
published What If Your Mother (2005) and her scholarship on motherhood, 
explores the influence of this matrix of relationality on women’s experi-
ences with pregnancy and abortion. In “Abortion Is a Motherhood Issue,” 
she writes about the separation of abortion from “discussions of mother-
ing, even when those discussions are carried on in the voices and writings 
of women of consciousness.” This separation, she notes, has many causes, 
including strategic separation in order to deflect the responses of “right- 
to-lifers.” But “sometimes,” she writes, the separation of abortion from 
motherhood happens because “we forget that abortion is, in the ordinary 
motherhood-type way, the concern of women who are taking responsibility 
for the lives of their children” (1994, 160).
When I began working in an abortion clinic, the clinic director was an 
activist who was not afraid to discuss the fetus. She told me a story about 
her appearance on a syndicated radio call-in show during which a caller 
challenged her to deny that late-second trimester abortions “kill babies.” 
“At that stage of pregnancy,” the caller said, “you can’t tell me it’s not 
a baby. And you can’t tell me that, if that baby is aborted, it won’t die.” 
Rather than engage in discussion about the definition of life (a discussion 
anti-abortion discourse has already delimited in the public realm, if not 
yet in the medical and legal realms), she simply said to him, “Yes. It’s a 
baby and yes, it is killed. I want to talk about all the reasons why so many 
women choose to have abortions even though they know this, and why 
it is important that women are allowed to make that choice.” The caller 
simply hung up the phone. When the director told me this story, I thought, 
I guess he did not have an argument prepared that would answer the 
complexity of women’s lived experiences. During my first two months in 
training at the clinic, I worked closely with women who were able to think 
clearly and compassionately about the fetus and about women who choose 
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abortions for whatever reason (even reasons with which I am uncomfort-
able). Although I identified as strongly pro-choice and had benefited from 
my own abortion experience when I was younger, I was initially surprised 
by some of the practices followed at the clinic to allow each woman to 
articulate her own “iterative process” by which her relationship to her 
fetus was produced.
When I speak with a woman about her abortion decision during our 
intake screening, I am always careful to use the language she uses to name 
the fetus. Some women say “pregnancy” and a great many merely say “it”; 
when a woman says “it,” I usually say “fetus,” deliberately choosing the 
most medical-sounding term. Very few patients say “fetus” or “embryo.” 
The majority say “baby,” as in “this baby is making me sicker than my 
previous ones did” or “I just can’t have this baby at this time.” When I 
began my training, I was shocked to hear clinic employees calling fetuses 
“babies”—as a strong feminist activist, I had learned to separate the two. 
But, as one of my co-workers explained to me, “if the woman who is 
choosing abortion experiences this as a baby, how are we helping her deal 
with her decision if we tell her she is wrong?” Now, when my patient calls 
her fetus “baby,” I do, too. Sometimes women will express their wish that 
they could have this baby as they explain why they cannot, as in, “I would 
really like to have this baby. I hoped it might be a girl. But my relation-
ship is not stable and I cannot afford another child on my own.” This is 
an iteration of the fetus that illustrates how many women do think about 
their relationships to the fetus when they make their choices to abort, 
and many consider the baby that fetus is (or will become) to them. Often, 
patients who indicate that spirituality is important to them tell me that 
they have prayed about their abortion decisions and have asked the deity 
to which they pray to send back to them the child they are aborting, at a 
time in the future when they are better able to care for it.
I acknowledge that these iterations of maternal-fetal connection are 
challenging in the context of current abortion politics. However, I am 
convinced that if we in the abortion rights movement told more of 
these stories, the stories would come to seem less shocking to us. Their 
telling would not lead to a weakening of our stance, to a strengthening 
of anti-abortion politics, as is often feared. Rather, I believe that these 
stories, which integrate traces of anti-abortion principles into abortion 
experiences, could begin the process of deconstructing the dichotomies 
that characterize the U.S. abortion debate and strengthen general public 
support for even challenging situations.
These stories complicate the simplistic politics of abortion by empha-
sizing the similarities between abortion and motherhood and collapsing 
the differences between concern for women and our choices and concern 
for fetal life. In other words, the honest stories of complex lives made a 
little less difficult by complicated choices would allow more people to 
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recognize abortion as one possible outcome of potential motherhood, as 
Arcana describes it. One of the charges that the anti-abortion movement 
makes of abortion rights activists, abortion providers, and women who 
abort is that we are “heartless.” Kissling quotes John Garvey who wrote 
in Commonweal that “perhaps there has been a ‘hardening of the heart’ 
resulting from the prochoice position” (2004/5, 5). I see Garvey’s point, 
but I wish he could talk with the patients and co-workers I have known 
at the clinic, that he, and others who think similarly, could see what goes 
on in some abortion clinics.6
In a 2003 Glamour article titled “Are You Ready to Really Under-
stand Abortion?” the techniques of a particular group of abortion clinics 
are examined. This group’s strategies were developed in response to an 
onslaught of Operation Rescue actions in 1989. Through my work, I have 
attended workshops with employees of these clinics, and many of our 
clinic practices are similar to theirs. Our services include grief counsel-
ing (for women who want it), and options counseling about adoption and 
motherhood (for most women). We strive to incorporate into the abortion 
experience each patient’s own religious values and emotional needs on 
an individual basis. Our patients fill out charts which include questions 
about their emotional responses to their pregnancies/abortions (are you 
happy? confident? relieved? sad? angry? trapped? scared?), their religious 
beliefs regarding abortions, and their support systems at home. We see a 
range of needs and responses, from the woman who is happily relieved not 
to be pregnant anymore to the woman who grieves deeply the child she 
will not birth and help the latter plan coping strategies for their grieving. 
In the clinics featured in the Glamour article, patients can write heart-
shaped letters to their fetuses, to other women in the clinic, or to their 
god telling about their feelings. These letters are posted on clinic walls. 
One is quoted: “I love you even though I know in my heart I can’t keep 
you. But the memory of you will make me strong.” It is signed, “All my 
love, the mom you’ll never meet” (Chen 2003, 264). A very similar letter 
hangs in the clinic where I work; this one was written by a 15-year-old 
patient. These are not experiences of disembodiment, of separation of 
woman from fetus, of mother from child. These are the experiences that 
speak to the complexity of abortion as it is lived by women rather than as 
it is expounded by activists.
Imagine the following scene in an abortion clinic: the patient is ready to 
go home after her abortion. Before she leaves, however, there is one more 
thing she wants to do. She enters the surgery lab with a clinic advocate and 
walks to the lab table under the window. There, in a glass lab dish, is her 
fetus. The advocate explains, “The dark red tissue at the top of the dish 
is endometrial tissue. The spongy pinkish tissue in this corner is the sac 
tissue. And this is the fetal tissue on the right. Does this look like what 
you expected?” The patient nods. She motions toward the forceps propped 
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against the dish and says, “Can I?” The advocate looks to the lab tech, 
who nods. The patient puts on the rubber gloves they hand her and picks 
up the small forceps, which she uses to grasp the fetus’ tiny hand, moving 
it slightly, somewhere between a wave and a handshake. “Goodbye little 
baby,” she says softly. “I’m sorry I couldn’t have you right now.” After a 
few more moments, she puts down the forceps, removes the gloves, and 
hugs the advocate. “Thank you all so much for making this a little easier 
for me.”
In the clinic where I work, a lab technician examines every patient’s 
post-procedure fetus and supporting tissue, in order to age it (by size) and 
to verify that the procedure is complete. In the process, the technician 
arranges the different elements of the fetus and tissue so that we may 
provide each patient an option to see her post-procedure fetus. About 
five percent of the women who have abortions at our clinic choose this 
option. We are, of course, very careful to prepare the women for what they 
are going to see. We have a fetal development guidebook, put together by 
two nurses who worked at our clinic in the 1990s, which we use for this 
purpose. With the patient who wishes to see her fetus and tissue, we look 
first at a line drawing of a fetus of the same fetal age as the woman’s. The 
line drawing is accompanied by descriptive text:
The fetus is approximately 6.1–6.4 inches long. If the fetus is a female, the 
uterus is formed and the vagina starts developing. If the fetus is a male, the 
testicles begin to move from the abdomen down into the scrotum. The toenails 
are beginning to develop. (18 wks fetal age; 20 wks LMP)
In addition to this description, the text notes that “most internal organs 
are rather well developed. However, the lungs and nervous system are 
still not mature and if the fetus were born prematurely, it would not 
survive.”
While going over this page with the patient, I explain that a fetus or 
baby develops like a house is built—the outside develops first, and then 
the organs are able to develop within the completed shell. This is why, 
for example, at 20 weeks LMP, the fetus has toenails but not yet work-
ing lungs or nervous system. I ask the woman if she has any questions, 
and I answer those as completely and accurately as I can, checking with 
the doctor or head nurse when necessary. After I answer her questions, I 
ask her if she is still interested in seeing her own post-abortion fetus and 
tissue. If she is, I explain that I will next show her another picture from the 
fetal development guidebook, a picture of similarly aged fetus and tissue 
after an abortion done at our clinic. This picture is a color photograph 
taken by a nurse (with permission, of course) of post-abortion fetus and 
tissue arranged in a backlit glass dish on a light box. The technician had 
arranged the elements so that the endometrial tissue, the sac tissue, and 
the fetal body are distinctly recognizable. Depending upon the age of the 
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fetus, the woman might see tiny little dark spots, which are eye buds, and 
some flipper-like limbs, or she might see a small ribcage and fully-formed 
legs and arms, and when second-trimester intact abortions were still legal, 
she might have seen a small, intact, fully-formed body.
Many women, of course, choose not to see their fetuses. The women 
who do give a variety of reasons for that choice. Several tell me that they 
are “just curious,” that they have seen pro-life images of abortion or of 
fetuses and are interested in what “it really looks like.” Other women say 
that seeing their fetus provides them with a sense of finality—they can see 
that the pregnancy is no longer in their bodies, and this reassures them. 
Some women choose to see their fetuses because they want to say good-
bye, and some ask us to pray with them or for permission to sprinkle the 
fetus with holy water that they have brought with them. This, I think, is 
the perspective that makes some abortion rights advocates uncomfortable. 
But if abortion rights discourse embraced discussion and images of the 
fetus and honest stories of the full range—from joy to grief—of women’s 
relationships to their fetuses and emotional responses to abortion, perhaps 
we could challenge the simple dichotomization of woman from fetus. 
Laury Oaks argues that the international pro-choice movement needs “a 
reproductive politics that takes seriously both fetuses as subjects in gen-
eral, and how women ‘see’ their fetuses in particular” (1999, 192). Frances 
Kissling’s article, and the outcry surrounding it, prove Oaks’ point. When 
a patient at our clinic takes my hand, looks into the glass dish with her 
fetus in it, and says, “That’s what I thought it would be,” I feel we have 
allowed that woman to make the best choice for herself in a supportive 
environment while taking seriously her relationship with her fetus. We 
have provided her a space from which to iterate her own abortion experi-
ence, in the words of Judith Arcana, with “open recognition of [her] regret 
or loss or joy or relief—even of mourning—and [with] acceptance of the 
responsibility of [her] choice” (1994, 163).
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this paper. In addition, the anonymous readers for NWSAJ were invaluable to 
the process of honing my argument. Thank you to the two research assistants 
who helped with this project, Jesse Houf and Megan Scanlon, both of whom 
know well what clinic work is like. This essay is dedicated to my co-workers 
and patients at the abortion clinic where I work.
I recognize that my claim might seem overblown; I make it based on others’ 2. 
responses. In fact, although one of the anonymous readers for NWSAJ 
“worr[ied]” that I was “overstat[ing]” this risk, another asked me to consider 
whether having accurate representation of women’s abortion experiences “is 
more important than losing the right to choose” and a third suggested that my 
approach might “just put women and feminists in a position where they have 
to justify ‘killing’ and where they have to endure further criminalization.” 
Although I respect these concerns, I trust that my argument makes evident 
my dedication to abortion rights and my conviction that these accounts can 
do the abortion rights movement much more good than harm.
Other feminist critics have published studies that examine what goes on 3. 
in abortion clinics. One of the best is Wendy Simonds’ Abortion at Work 
(1996), an ethnographic study of one clinic’s staff, which focuses on the labor, 
politics, and interpersonal relationships of those who work to provide safe 
and legal abortions. Elizabeth Poppema’s memoir, Why I Am an Abortion 
Doctor (1996), describes abortion provision from a physician’s perspective, 
while two collections of women’s personal abortion stories, Our Choices, Our 
Lives (2002), edited by Krista Jacob, and Abortion: A Collective Story (2002), 
by Cara J. MariAnna provide patients’ descriptions of their experiences with 
abortion.
The phrase “head-first presentation” is either an error in the law or a loophole: 4. 
the D&X procedure would not be performed using a head-first removal of the 
fetal body. The whole purpose of the intrauterine cranial decompression (which 
the congressional findings calls “removing the baby’s brains”) is to allow the 
fetal head, the largest part of the fetal body, to be removed through the woman’s 
cervix without extensive cervical dilation. If a head-first presentation were 
being performed at this stage of pregnancy (after twenty weeks), the most 
likely methods would be hysterotomy (surgical removal of the fetus through 
the abdominal wall) or induction abortion, in which a substance is introduced 
into the fetal body, labor is induced and the woman gives birth to a dead fetus/
baby. This is only one example of the ban’s ambiguities, which many critics 
argue point to its potential applicability to multiple abortion procedures. Since 
the law includes description of a head-first presentation, it could possibly be 
applied to induction abortion or hysterotomy as well as D&X.
It is ironic that the activists and politicians who have for years invoked rep-5. 
resentations of dismembered fetuses to show how terrible abortion is have 
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now made it nearly impossible for women to obtain abortions that do not 
dismember fetuses.
I am not claiming universality here. Feminist author Renate Klein reminds me 6. 
that not all clinics and not all doctors are like the ones I have been fortunate 
to work with. I thank her for her thoughtful responses to my work and for 
her encouragement.
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